wt  _ 

d-V\  \ v\  ^ 


The  Situation  in  China 


By  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck. 


Issued  by 

The  China  Society  of  America,  Inc. 

19  West  44th  Street  New  York  City 


^*7 


APRIL,  1927 


Foreword 


The  China  Society  presents  this  summary  as 
an  aid  to  the  understanding  of  the  present  sit- 
uation in  China. 

Dr.  Hornbeck,  author  of  “Contemporary  Pol- 
itics in  the  Far  East,”  Lecturer  on  History  of 
the  Far  East  at  Harvard  University,  Technical 
Adviser  to  the  American  Delegations  at  the 
Paris,  the  Washington  and  the  Peking  Confer- 
ences, is  recognized  as  one  of  the  foremost  au- 
thorities on  the  politics  of  the  Far  East. 

A part  of  this  survey  appeared  in  the  Bulletin 
of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  January, 
1927. 


The  Situation  In  China 

By  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck 

China  is  today  in  the  throes  of  two  great  political 
efforts.  First,  rival  leaders  or  factions  are  contend- 
ing for  power;  some  are  struggling  to  extend,  others 
to  preserve  the  measure  of  authority  which  they 
have  attained  during  the  years  since  the  overthrow  of 
the  Monarchy  (1912).  Second,  most  of  those  who, 
in  China’s  vast  population,  are  politically  articulate 
are  in  revolt  against  the  influence  which  foreign 
governments,  foreign  nationals  and  foreign  ideas 
have  acquired  in  their  country. 

The  wars  which  have  been  waged  during  the  past 
ten  years  have  been  factional.  Various  leaders, 
groups  and  parties  have  been  contending  for  a supre- 
macy to  which  none  has  a lawful  claim.  Each  has 
raised  armies,  collected  revenues,  and  waged  his  or 
its  contest  against  one  or  more  of  the  others.  A sem- 
blance of  central  authority  has  been  maintained  in 
Peking;  but  at  this  moment  even  the  Peking  govern- 
ment is  self-appointed  and  has  a narrowly  limited 
authority.  The  city  of  Peking  is  fought  for  as  a 
political  prize,  because:  first,  it  is  the  traditional  seat 
of  authority;  second,  it  possesses  the  physical  equip- 
ment of  government;  and,  third,  certain  of  the  more 
important  sources  of  revenue  still  contribute  to  the 
exchequer  located  there. 


3 


During  the  past  fourteen  years,  some  eight  polit- 
ical leaders  have  held  the  highest  office  in  Peking; 
some  forty-two  recognizable  Cabinets  have  func- 
tioned there;  and  some  nine  Parliaments  have  met. 
At  the  present  moment  there  is  no  recognized  Chief 
Executive.  There  is  no  Parliament  in  being.  There 
is  no  constitution  in  force.  There  is  no  uniform 
system  of  laws.  The  work  of  elaborating  new  codes 
of  law  on  western  models  has  been  carried  for- 
ward, and  several  of  the  codes  have  been  declared 
in  effect  by  Executive  Mandate,  but  there  are  gaps, 
and  certain  codes  which  are  nominally  in  effect 
have  not  been  adopted  by  the  recognized  legal  pro- 
cesses prescribed  in  any  of  the  Constitutions  which 
have  been,  from  time  to  time,  in  effect. 

Governments  at  Peking  have  been  made  and  un- 
made by  military  leaders.  In  1924  President  Tsao 
Kun’s  Government  was  overthrown  by  a coup 
d’etat  manipulated  by  Feng  Yu-hsiang,  the  “Chris- 
tian General.”  Feng  imprisoned  Tsao  Kun,  and 
then,  by  agreement  with  Marshal  Chang  Tso-lin, 
of  Manchuria,  placed  Tuan  Chi-jui  in  authority  as 
“Provisional  Chief  Executive.”  Tsao  was  held 
prisoner  in  the  palace  until,  in  the  spring  of  1926, 
Feng’s  forces  were  driven  from  Peking;  he  was 
then  released,  but  was  not  restored  to  office.  When, 
in  April  1926,  the  combined  forces  of  Chang  Tso- 
lin  and  Wu  Pei-fu  took  Peking,  Feng’s  forces 
withdrew  to  the  northwest,  and  the  Provisional 
Chief  Executive,  Tuan  Chi-jui,  left  Peking  hur- 
riedly and  unceremoniously.  For  several  days  there- 


4 


after  there  existed  no  “central  government.”  Finally 
a number  of  experienced  officials  and  military  lead- 
ers, constituted  themselves,  with  the  assent  of  four 
northern  “war  lords,”  an  acting  government,  with 
the  designation  “Regency  Cabinet.” 

There  were  at  that  time  upon  the  stage  four  out- 
standing military  leaders.  Each  had  his  own  army, 
each  his  own  principality.  In  Manchuria,  with 
seat  of  government  at  Mukden,  Marshal  Chang 
Tso-lin.  Chang’s  power  extended  into  the  metro- 
politan Province  of  Chihli  and  into  Shantung,  and 
he  had  a substantial  measure  of  authority,  but  not 
control,  in  Peking.  In  central  China,  with  base 
on  the  Peking-Hankow  Railway,  Wu  Pei-fu.  Wu 
was  in  command  of  a coalition  of  military  forces 
no  unit  of  which  was  absolutely  his  own.  Chang 
Tso-lin  and  Wu  Pei-fu  had  cooperated  in  driving 
the  “People’s  National  Army”  of  Feng  Yu-hsiang 
from  Peking.  Wu  thus  shared  with  Chang  an  in- 
fluence at  Peking.  West  of  Kalgan,  Feng  Yu- 
hsiang  was  in  control  of  an  indefinite  area  spoken 
of  as  the  “Northwest.”  In  central  eastern  China, 
north  and  south  of  the  Yangtze  River,  Sun  Chuang- 
fang  had  effected  a coalition  of  military  forces 
which  gave  him  supreme  command  but  by  no  means 
unassailable  authority  in  five  rich  provinces.  In 
the  South,  that  is  Kwangtung  and  its  hinterland, 
Chiang  Kai-shek,  commanding  the  armies  of  the 
Kuo  Min  Tang  (“Nationalist  Party”)  had  consoli- 
dated his  power,  with  the  aid  of  Russian  advisers 
and  officers  (of  Soviet  persuasion),  and  was  pre- 
paring for  a campaign  northwards. 

5 


At  Canton  there  had  been  developed  since  1917  a 
government  which  claimed,  as  did  the  government 
at  Peking,  to  be  the  government  of  (all)  China. 
There  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  had  been  elected  “President 
of  China”  (1921).  There,  shortly  before  his  death, 
Dr.  Sun  had  decided  to  accept  assistance  from  Soviet 
Russia — a decision  which  produced  a schism  in  his 
party — and  had  entrusted  to  General  Chiang  the 
task  of  creating  an  army  with  which  to  “unify”  the 
country.  The  administration  of  Canton  by  the  Na- 
tionalist Government  had  been  favorably  comment- 
ed on  by  many  observers.* 

The  long  threatened  northward  advance  (“march 
on  Peking”)  of  the  Canton  forces  was  launched 
early  in  the  summer  of  1926.  Chiang  Kai-shek’s 
army  took  Changsha,  crossed  the  Yangtze  above 
Hankow,  took  Hanyang  and  its  arsenal,  then  took 
Hankow,  and  later,  after  a siege  of  several  weeks 
took  Wuchang,  and,  proceeding  down  the  river, 
took  Kiukiang.  The  success  of  his  armies  increased 
Chiang  Kai-shek’s  prestige  and  so  materially  dam- 
aged Wu  Pei-fu  that  not  a few  observers  declared 
the  latter  “finished.”  Chiang  has  since  pressed  on, 
south  of  the  Yangtze,  and  has  just  now  (March  21, 
1927)  taken  the  region  around  Shanghai. 

Although  it  should  be  clearly  understood  that 
these  military  operations  are  not  those  of  a revolu- 
tionary organization  seeking  to  overthrow  a legiti- 
mate government,  it  should  not  be  thought  that 

*Dr.  Sun  died  in  Peking  in  March,  1926,  on  the  eve  of  a conference  which  he 
was  to  have  had  with  northern  “War  Lords”. 


6 


there  is  no  more  underlying  all  this  activity  than 
the  interests  and  ambitions  of  the  military  leaders. 
There  is  a clash  of  ideas.  There  is  a contest  be- 
tween comparatively  conservative  and  compara- 
tively radical  groups.  It  is  not,  as  it  is  so  often 
put,  a struggle  between  North  China  and  South 
China.  There  is  no  political  or  economic  line  of 
cleavage  in  China.  There  is  no  party  which  is 
confined  to  the  South;  and  there  is  no  party  which 
controls  all  of  the  North.  One  party,  however,  has 
nation-wide  affiliations  and  has  in  every  province 
some  influence.  This  is  the  Kuo  Min  Tang,  or 
Nationalist  Party.  The  other  parties  are  composed 
on  a basis  either  of  personal  or  of  territorial  affilia- 
tions. The  Kuo  Min  Party  may  be  said  to  embody 
the  spirit  of  the  “revolution”;  it  carries  on  from 
the  overthrow  of  the  monarchy;  it  has  a “plat- 
form”; it  talks  of  “popular  government”;  it  repre- 
sents the  undisciplined  and  enthusiastic  desire  of  a 
portion  of  the  population  of  every  province  to  break 
with  tradition  and  throw  off  restraining  and  retard- 
ing influences. 

It  is,  naturally,  from  the  ranks  of  this  party  and 
its  leaders  that  the  most  insistent  of  the  fulmina- 
tions  of  the  Chinese  against  foreigners,  foreign  in- 
fluence, foreign  powers,  emanate.  In  it  are  en- 
rolled the  majority,  but  by  no  means  all,  of  the 
“western  educated”  students.  It  flourishes  most  in 
the  South, — for  the  southern  Chinese  are  by  tem- 
perament more  revolutionary,  more  ardent  than  the 
northern  Chinese,  and  South  China  has  known  more 

7 


of  foreign  contact  and  influence  than  has  North 
China.  From  South  China  have  gone  most  of 
China’s  emigrants;  and  from  these  emigrants  there 
has  come  back  into  China  a steady  stream  of  agita- 
tion and  funds  for  revolutionary  enterprises.  South 
China  has  been  the  birthplace  of  most  of  the  revo- 
lutions of  the  Chinese  against  their  Rulers,  and  in 
South  China  the  spirit  of  revolt  is  most  acute  today. 

But  it  should  not  be  thought  that  the  Kuo  Min 
Party  and  the  South  are  alone  indoctrinated  with 
the  ideas  of  revolt  which  are  becoming  daily  more 
and  more  manifest  in  China.  Chinese  everywhere 
have  shown  during  the  past  ten  years  increasing 
signs  of  a developing  national  self-consciousness. 
Ten  years  ago  one  heard  in  the  foreign  “conces- 
sions” a general  damning  of  the  Chinese  as  a peo- 
ple possessed  of  no  patriotism.  Today  one  hears 
in  the  same  places  a general  damning  of  Chinese 
nationalism.  There  is  unquestionably  developing 
in  China  that  conception  of  national  interests  and 
national  rights  which  is  called  “patriotism.”  Not 
every  Chinese,  not  one  in  ten,  perhaps  not  one  in 
a hundred,  has  what  we  would  call  a “conscious- 
ness” or  even  an  opinion  with  regard  to  political 
questions.  The  “public”  consists  of  at  most  a few 
million  citizens,  those  who  either  are  educated  or 
possess  substantial  means  or  wield  military  power. 
These  constitute  articulate  China.  Politically  speak- 
ing, they  are  the  nation.  Their  number  is  sufficient 
to  constitute  what  would  be  a considerable  body 
politic  in  any  state.  Among  them  there  is  develop- 


8 


ing,  more  and  more,  a solidarity  of  sentiment  which 
has  manifested  itself  for  two  decades  in  defensive 
effort  to  resist  foreign  influence  and  which  is  now 
manifesting  itself  in  thought  and  action  directed 
toward  the  destruction  of  the  privileged  position 
which  has  been  accorded  to  or  acquired  by  foreign 
nations  and  foreign  nationals  in  China. 

The  Chinese  “Nationalists”  are  taking  advantage 
of  every  evidence  and  opportunity  to  proclaim 
aloud  to  their  own  people  and  to  the  world  that 
China  has  been  and  is  being  oppressed  by  the  for- 
eign Powers;  that  China  is  bound  down  by  “un- 
equal treaties”;  that  Chinese  laws,  customs,  and 
manners  are  being  corrupted  by  foreigners;  and  that 
foreign  domination  must  be  shaken  off.  The  pres- 
ent antipathy  of  the  Chinese  people  appears  to  be 
not  against  foreigners  as  individuals  or  as  alien  per- 
sons but  against  the  forces,  the  system,  the  theories 
and  practices  of  government  of  the  foreign  nations 
as  manifested  in  relationships  with  China. 

The  Occident  went  to  the  Orient  uninvited  and 
unwanted.  Navigators,  merchants,  missionaries  and 
soldiers  from  the  Occident  forced  themselves  upon 
an  unwilling  Siam,  an  unwilling  Japan  and  an  un- 
willing China.  Of  these  countries,  China,  with  her 
huge  area,  her  enormous  population,  her  laissez- 
faire  practices  and  principles  of  government,  has 
not  yet  made  the  readjustment  for  which  the  new 
contacts  call.  The  Chinese  have  never  been  accus- 
tomed to  precision,  exact  definitions,  legal  prescrip- 
tions and  contracts  written  out  and  agreed  upon  in 


9 


minute  detail.  In  the  dispensation  of  justice  much 
of  their  law  is  to  be  found  in  the  minds  of  the 
magistrates.  In  the  making  of  contracts  much  is 
left  to  the  attitudes  and  needs  of  the  parties  when 
performance  becomes  due.  The  Occidental  found 
China’s  laws,  conceptions  of  justice,  methods  of  ad- 
ministration different  from  those  of  the  West.  He 
found  Chinese  customs,  conceptions  of  propriety, 
methods  of  doing  business  different  from  his.  He 
found  Chinese  religions,  conceptions  of  human  ob- 
ligations and  methods  of  performance  different 
from  his.  Where  Chinese  ideas  and  practices  have 
differed  from  those  of  the  Occident,  the  man  from 
the  West  has  insisted,  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  that 
the  Chinese  idea  is  wrong  and  the  Western  right. 

A century  and  a half  ago,  the  Chinese  knew 
nothing  about  foreign  governments,  constitutions, 
republics,  representative  government,  separation 
of  powers,  etc.  They  knew  nothing  of  inter- 
national law.  They  had  no  treaties  (except  cer- 
tain old  agreements  with  Russia).  The  West 
insisted  that  they  learn  these  things,  taught  them, 
and  forced  them  to  sign  treaties.  The  Powers  in- 
sisted that  China  adopt  and  maintain  a fixed  sched- 
ule of  customs  duties;  they  insisted  that  the  Chinese 
admit  Christian  missionaries,  allow  them  to  preach 
and  teach  without  obstacle  and  permit  them  to  buy 
and  own  land  wherever  they  might  please  for  the 
prosecution  of  their  enterprises.  They  insisted  that, 
inasmuch  as  Chinese  laws  were  different,  those  laws 
should  not  apply  to  “foreigners.”  Nevertheless, 


10 


they  have  sought  constantly  to  bring  it  about  that 
Chinese  laws  be  altered  upon  the  model  of  the 
Occidental  legal  systems. 

Foreign  influence  and  foreign  pressure  contri- 
buted to  bringing  on  the  revolution  of  1911.  Revo- 
lutions the  Chinese  had  had  before,  plenty  of  them, 
but  never  one  which  at  the  same  time  overthrew  a 
dynasty,  declared  against  the  principle  of  monarchy, 
and  undertook  to  establish  a government  based  on 
principles  of  election,  representation  and  responsi- 
bility. 

When  the  governments  of  the  foreign  Powers 
dictated  the  provisions  of  the  treaties  which  they 
compelled  the  Manchu  rulers  of  China  to  sign, 
they  wrote  into  these  treaties  some  provisions  call- 
ing for  performance  which  neither  the  Manchus 
nor  any  other  Chinese  government  could  enforce. 
Now,  the  Manchus  and  the  Mandarinate  who 
signed  those  contracts  have  disappeared.  Today 
the  Chinese  people  are  convinced,  rightly  or  wrong- 
ly, that  the  rules  and  treaty  provisions  which  the 
foreign  governments  cite  as  rightfully  applicable 
to  the  contacts  between  China  and  the  foreign  Pow- 
ers are  inequitable  and  intolerably  disadvantageous 
to  one  of  the  parties  concerned,  namely  the  Chinese. 
Moreover,  they  contend  that  neither  the  Chinese 
people  nor  the  officials  who  represented  them  ever 
agreed  to  some  of  the  provisions  in  the  sense  of  the 
interpretations  which  foreigners  have  chosen  to  put 
upon  them. 


11 


At  the  Washington  Conference  (1921-1922)  steps 
were  taken  and  agreements  were  entered  into  look- 
ing toward  the  revision  and  adjustment  of  various 
of  the  treaty  provisions.  Among  other  things  it  was 
agreed  that  the  rates  of  duty  of  the  Chinese  treaty 
tariff  should  be  increased  and  that  a Commission 
should  be  created  to  examine  China’s  laws,  courts, 
prisons  and  administration  of  justice,  and  to  report 
on  facts  and  make  recommendations  in  relation  to 
the  problem  of  legal  jurisdiction  in  China. 

The  Special  Conference  on  the  Chinese  Tariff 
met  in  October,  1925,  and  worked  for  nine  months. 
It  did  not  succeed  in  arriving  at  the  agreements 
necessary  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  Wash- 
ington Treaty.  The  nearest  approach  to  definite 
action  by  the  Conference  was  the  adoption  by  the 
Delegates  on  November  17,  1925,  of  a resolution, 
the  substance  of  which  was  intended  to  be  incor- 
porated in  a treaty,  declaring  that  China  should  be 
permitted  to  enjoy  tariff  autonomy,  putting  a na- 
tional tariff  law  into  effect,  in  1929,  and  that  China 
should  abolish  the  system  of  levying  internal  duties 
upon  merchandise  in  transit.  Inasmuch  as  the 
treaty  has  not  been  negotiated,  this  resolution  has, 
presumably,  no  legal  standing,  but  its  adoption 
has  had  the  effect  of  giving  the  Chinese  the  im- 
pression that  their  right  to  enjoy  tariff  autonomy 
has  been  admitted  and  affirmed  by  qualified  repre- 
sentatives of  the  foreign  Powers. 

In  July,  1926,  the  Tariff  Conference  adjourned 
sine  die.  For  months  there  had  been  no  formal  full 


12 


sessions.  The  delegates  of  the  foreign  Powers  had 
stayed  on  in  Peking,  in  spite  of  wars  which  were 
waged  around  the  capital,  while  the  Government 
fell,  while  the  Provisional  Chief  Executive  and 
seven  of  the  original  ten  Chinese  Delegates  left, — 
they  had  stayed  on,  hoping  that  a new  treaty  might 
be  negotiated.  The  adjournment  came  not  because 
the  Powers  had  not  wanted  and  had  not  tried  to 
carry  out  and  go  beyond — far  beyond— the  provi- 
sions of  the  Washington  Treaty;  it  came  because 
and  not  until  after  the  Nationalist  Government 
(Canton)  and  the  People’s  National  Army  (Feng 
Yu-hsiang)  served  notice  in  the  middle  of  July 
that  they  would  respect  no  treaty,  no  matter  what 
the  provisions,  entered  into  by  the  Peking  authori- 
ties. Before  the  adjournment,  the  delegates  of  the 
foreign  Powers  declared  unanimously  that  they 
would  be  glad  to  go  on  with  the  Conference  when- 
ever the  Chinese  Delegates  should  be  in  position  to 
resume  the  negotiations. 

The  Commission  on  Extraterritoriality  met  in 
January,  1926,  pursued  its  investigations,  and  pro- 
duced in  the  middle  of  September  a report  signed 
by  all  of  the  Commissioners.  The  text  of  this  re- 
port was  made  public  in  December  (1926).  In  it 
the  Commissioners  have  given  an  accurate  account 
of  the  laws  and  thd  administration  of  justice  in 
contemporary  China.  They  have  made  suggestions 
with  regard  to  steps  which  should  be  taken  both  by 
China  and  by  the  foreign  Powers  to  bring  about  a 
situation  in  which  it  may  be  safe  to  abolish  the 


13 


extraterritorial  system;  also,  suggestions  with  re- 
gard to  the  removal  of  abuses  while  the  system  con- 
tinues in  existence.  Among  other  things,  they  have 
pointed  out  that  the  new  codes  have  not  been  put 
into  effect  by  legally  prescribed  processes,  that  some 
have  not  been  put  into  effect  at  all,  that  some  are 
not  yet  completed,  and  that  the  work  of  preparing 
some  has  not  even  been  begun. 

This  whole  problem  of  legal  reform  in  China  is 
one  which  presents  great  difficulties.  Chinese  con- 
ceptions of  law,  justice,  punishment,  etc.,  differ 
radically  at  some  points  from  those  of  the  Occident. 
Even  among  nations  in  the  Occident,  there  are  sub- 
stantial differences.  Yet  the  effort  is  being  made  to 
produce  in  and  for  China  a body  of  laws  which 
will  meet  with  the  approval  of  all  of  the  important 
Treaty  Powers.  China’s  new  codes  are  being  based 
principally  upon  French  and  German  models  or 
Japanese  adaptations  thereof.  The  inevitable  result 
has  been  and  will  be  that  the  codes  contain  many 
provisions  which  are  not  an  outgrowth  of  Chinese 
thought  and  experience,  which  are  inconsistent  with 
Chinese  conceptions,  and  which  will  run  counter  to 
traditional  Chinese  habits  and  practices.  If  China’s 
new  laws  satisfy  the  foreigners,  will  they  be  suited 
to  the  Chinese?  If  they  are  suited  to  the  Chinese, 
will  they  satisfy  the  foreigners?  Can  there  be  pro- 
duced a system  of  law  which,  both  as  to  regulations 
and  administration,  can  be  applied  equally,  with 
justice  and  with  satisfaction,  to  the  Chinese  people 
and  to  the  nationals  of  some  twenty"  foreign  Powers 
who  reside,  travel  and  do  business  in  China? 


14 


Thus,  notwithstanding  the  pledges  made  and  the 
steps  which  have  been  taken  looking  toward  their 
fulfillment,  the  simple  fact  remains  that  up  to  this 
moment  nothing  conclusive  has  been  accomplished 
in  reference  to  the  general  program  of  treaty  re- 
vision (i.e.  in  reference  to  the  old  commercial  and 
other  treaties)  for  which  the  Chinese  contended  at 
Paris  eight  years  ago.* 

The  Treaty  Powers  have,  however,  done  much 
during  the  past  ten  years  toward  giving  up  special 
rights  and  privileges.  At  Paris,  the  German  and 
Austrian  privileges  (except  Shantung)  were  sur- 
rendered back  to  China.  At  Washington  (and  im- 
mediately after),  Shantung  was  restored;  the  for- 
eign post-offices  were  removed ; negotiations  were 
begun  for  restoration  of  Weihaiwei;  provisions 
were  agreed  upon  to  ensure  respect  for  China’s 
sovereignty  and  discontinuance  of  foreign  aggres- 
sions. Most  of  the  Powers  have  either  given  up  their 
rights  in  or  remitted  their  shares  of  the  Boxer  in- 
demnity. At  Peking  a real  effort  was  made  to  solve 
the  tariff  problem.  The  Extraterritoriality  Com- 
mission produced  a substantial  body  of  practical 
suggestions  and  recommendations.  In  January  1927 
the  Mixed  Courts  at  Shanghai  were  turned  over 
to  the  Chinese  authorities-  The  foreigners  at  Shang- 
hai have  taken  definite  steps  toward  admitting 
Chinese  to  participation  in  the  government  of  the 
International  Settlement.f 

•Negotiations  with  regard  to  several  of  these  treaties  have  recently  been  entered 
into  between  China  and  the  foreign  Powers  individually  concerned. 

tThe  Chinese  now  demand  a "50-50”  representation. 


IS 


Banditry  is  ever  present  in  China,  and  rebellion 
in  some  part  or  parts  of  the  country  is  almost  a 
chronic  condition.  There  would  probably  be  civil 
warfare  in  China  today  even  if  there  had  been  no 
foreign  influence,  even  if  there  were  no  treaties. 
The  late  Manchu  dynasty  and  Chinese  officialdom 
have  a heavy  responsibility  for  the  political  chaos 
which  prevails.  The  charge  that  the  foreign  Pow- 
ers and  their  nationals  are  principally  responsible 
for  it  will  not  stand.  But  to  the  kind  of  trouble 
which  prevails  in  China  today,  the  impact  of  the 
Occident  gave  the  original  impetus,  and  foreign 
Powers  and  peoples  continue  to  make  direct  and 
indirect  contributions.  Foreigners  constituted  them- 
selves China’s  tutors.  Foreigners  wrote  the  treaties. 
Foreigners  took  concessions  in  China.  Foreigners 
financed  various  enterprises  in  China.  Now,  solici- 
tous with  regard  to  their  privileges,  their  invest- 
ments and  their  trade,  some  of  them  participate  in 
the  formation  of  Chinese  political  combinations 
and  contribute  to  the  successes  or  defeat  of  Chinese 
military  leaders,  their  contribution  and  participa- 
tion being  determined  by  their  view  of  the  effect 
upon  interests  which  they  regard  as  vested.  Thus, 
for  example,  notwithstanding  the  existence  of  a 
diplomatic  agreement  whereby  the  governments  of 
the  principal  treaty  Powers  have  agreed  not  to  per- 
mit their  nationals  to  sell  arms  to  China,  the  Chi- 
nese find  it  possible  to  purchase  from  certain  for- 
eign sources,  arms,  munitions  and  equipment  in  any 
amount  for  which  they  are  prepared  to  pay  cash. 


16 


Of  all  the  foreign  governments,  that  of  Soviet 
Russia  is  probably  the  most  active  in  the  prosecu- 
tion of  a positive  China  policy.  Russia  is  no  longer 
party  to  any  of  the  old  style  treaties  or  agreements 
with  China  and  the  Soviet  Government  openly 
opposes  the  efforts  of  all  the  Powers  which  seek  to 
follow  the  principle  of  cooperative  action.  The 
objective  underlying  Russia’s  China  policy  appears 
to  be  that  of  making  trouble,  trouble  for  everybody, 
trouble  particularly  for  the  “capitalistic”  states, 
trouble  for  China.  It  may  well  be  doubted  whether 
the  Soviet  leaders  entertain  any  hope  of  “bolshe- 
vizing”  China  in  the  sense  of  making  China  com- 
munistic. If  they  have  such  hope  it  will  be  vain. 
But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  they  seek  to  in- 
doctrinate the  Chinese  with  the  idea  of  revolt — 
and  in  this  they  are  being  highly  successful.  Dur- 
ing the  past  two  years  they  have  been  the  main 
foreign  support  of  the  People’s  National  army  in  the 
North  (Feng)  and  the  Nationalist  Government  and 
army  (Canton-Hankow)  in  the  South.  They  have 
supplied  money,  munitions,  advisers  and  officers. 

It  is  estimated  that  the  various  Chinese  armies 
total  in  the  aggregate  between  1,200,000  and  1,500,- 
000  men.  The  Mukden,  Shanghai  and  Canton- 
Hankow  forces  have  their  own  arsenals,  each  turn- 
ing out  rifles  and  small  arms  ammunition.  Muk- 
den has  the  most  extensive  ordnance  plants  and 
Chang  Tso-lin  has  equipped  his  forces  with  light 
field  guns  and  trench  mortars.  He  is  building  up 
a large  aircraft  equipment.  It  is  generally  con- 

17 


sidered  that  Feng  and  Chiang  Kai-shek  have  the 
best  trained  and  best  ordered  soldiers,  Feng  has 
no  independent  sources  of  equipment  or  supplies. 
He  has  been  dependent  on  Russia.  In  fighting 
quality,  it  is  generally  felt  that  the  men  of  the 
north  are  superior  to  those  of  the  south,  with  the 
exception  of  those  of  Hunan,  but  in  morale  the 
Nationalist  armies  are  superior.  Financially,  Muk- 
den and  Shanghai  are  more  independent  than  are 
the  other  centers.  Feng  controls  a relatively  in- 
fertile and  non-lucrative  principality.  Wu  owes 
much  of  his  weakness  to  lack  of  funds.  The  Can- 
ton-Hankow  Government  has  developed  a sub- 
stantial independent  income. 

Each  of  the  major  military  leaders  is  an  abso- 
lute ruler,  exercising  power  of  life  and  death  and 
collecting  taxes  at  will  throughout  the  region  over 
which  he  has  control,  except  that,  in  the  region 
under  control  of  the  Nationalist  Government,  the 
military  authority  is — in  theory  at  least — subordi- 
nate to  that  of  the  Executive  Committee. 

In  many  of  the  campaigns  money  is  more  de- 
cisive than  bullets.  Both  officers  and  men  fre- 
quently go  over  from  one  side  to  the  other.  Cities 
fall  without  a battle.  Armies  temporarily  vic- 
torious seem  strangely  reluctant  to  follow  up  and 
annihilate  the  enemy.  All  the  while  the  people 
are  made  to  pay  the  bills — and  the  bank  accounts 
of  the  “tuchuns”  grow. 

China’s  public  finances  are  in  a state  of  com- 
plete chaos.  Except  for  the  Customs  and  a portion 


18 


of  the  Salt  revenues,  Peking  is  receiving  nothing 
from  the  provinces;  taxes  everywhere  are  being 
collected  by  the  authorities  locally  in  control  and 
are  being  expended  almost  entirely  upon  military 
activities.  The  whole  of  the  revenue  derived  from 
the  operation  of  the  railroads  is  taken  and  expended 
in  that  way.  Nothing  is  being  put  back  into  equip- 
ment and  no  new  lines  are  being  constructed,  ex- 
cept in  Manchuria. 

Nevertheless,  taking  the  country  as  a whole,  pri- 
vate business  appears  to  increase.  This  is  unques- 
tionably true  with  regard  to  foreign  trade.  The 
figures  of  the  Customs  revenue  show  an  increase 
every  year.  But  the  amount  of  this  foreign  trade 
which  is  handled  by  foreign  firms  located  in  China 
shows  relatively  a decrease.  The  Chinese  are  ap- 
parently taking  over,  bit  by  bit,  the  importing  and 
exporting  business.  Military  operations,  banditry, 
issues  of  paper  currency  and  other  irregularities 
tend  to  retard  the  development  of  trade;  but  it  must 
be  remembered  that  only  a portion  of  China’s  area 
and  a part  of  her  people  are  directly  affected  by 
these  factors.  Opium  is  being  grown  in  many 
areas  in  larger  amount  probably  than  in  any  pre- 
vious period  in  China’s  history, — and  the  armies 
take  the  profits. 

Among  the  adverse  effects  of  the  political  and 
military  turmoil,  probably  the  most  unfortunate  in 
the  long  run  is  the  fact  that  educational  develop- 
ment is  at  a standstill.  China  has  today  only  some 


19 


seven  million  boys  and  girls  in  her  schools,  less 
than  one  in  fifty  of  her  population.  There  never 
has  been  even  an  approach  to  adequate  provision 
for  primary  schools  and  middle  schools  properly 
to  feed  the  established  colleges  and  universities,  and 
in  the  government  colleges  and  universities  there 
has  not  been  in  recent  years  a high  standard.  Now, 
almost  no  provision  is  being  made  even  for  main- 
tenance, to  say  nothing  of  expansion.  Were  it  not 
for  the  missionary  institutions  and  the  Indemnity 
College  at  Peking  (Tsinghua),  opportunities  for 
higher  education  in  China  would  be  almost  en- 
tirely lacking.  Even  the  missionary  institutions 
have  suffered  greatly  and  are  operating  under  han- 
dicaps. Some  have  been  compelled  recently  to 
close.  The  revolt  against  foreign  influence,  the 
general  insurgency  of  Young  China,  and  the  sym- 
pathetic tolerance  of  some  of  the  missionary  staffs 
have  produced  a tendency  to,  despise  discipline, 
with  results  seriously  detrimental  to  scholarship. 

The  latest  developments  in  the  domestic  military 
contest  have  been  the  realignment  of  northern  lead- 
ers under  the  direction  of  Chang  Tso-lin  in  order 
to  stop  the  northward  advance  of  the  so  far  vic- 
torious Canton-Hankow  forces  and  the  steady  ad- 
vance of  the  latter  eastward  in  the  Yangtze  Valley 
south  of  the  River.  Sun  Chuan-fang  has  been 
eliminated;  Chang  Tsung-chang,  who  succeeded 
him  in  the  Shanghai  region,  has  been  evicted  from 
that  region;  and  the  Nationalist  (Canton-Hankow) 
army  is  in  control  of  the  Shanghai  area.  The  for- 


20 


eign  Powers  have  at  Shanghai  substantial  naval  and 
military  forces,  for  the  protection  of  the  limited 
area  (International  Settlement  and  French  conces- 
sion) which  is  under  foreign  administrative  juris- 
diction. The  Wu  Pei-fu  block,  Wu  himself  being 
apparently  no  longer  in  control  of  it,  still  sits 
astride  of  the  Peking-Hankow  Railway  north  of 
Hankow.  Feng  Yu-hsiang  has  advanced  southward 
through  Shensi  and  his  armies  lie  to  the  west  near 
to  and  constantly  menacing  the  Wu  Pei-fu  group. 
Feng  is  a member  of  the  Nationalist  Party  and  an 
ally  of  the  Canton-Hankow  Government. 

In  the  revolt  against  the  foreign  Powers,  the 
Chinese  have  found  organized  boycotts  decidedly 
effective  and  are  having  resort  with  increased  fre- 
quency to  strikes.  The  combination  of  the  two,  as 
prosecuted  at  Canton,  has  had  a very  serious  effect 
upon  British  interests  and  has  visibly  affected  Brit- 
ish policy  during  the  past  year.  Both  the  boycott 
and  the  strike  are  two-edged  and  dangerous  weap- 
ons, but  the  Chinese  are  more  skillful  in  the  use  of 
defensive  than  of  offensive  measures.  The  recent 
propaganda  among  the  masses  is  forging  a weapon 
which  may  prove  more  dangerous  to  its  creators 
than  to  those  against  whom  it  is  directed.  The 
foreign  Powers  are  reluctant  to  use  force  and  may 
be  expected  to  do  so  only  to  prevent  violence. 

There  is  one  factor  in  the  domestic  struggle 
which  holds  out  a substantial  promise  of  improve- 
ment. It  is  the  fact  that  a Nationalist  Movement 
is  in  full  swing  and  that  this  movement  is  tending 
to  produce,  in  the  political  and  military  fields, 
some  effective  organization. 


21 


The  Nationalist  Movement  is  a bigger  thing  than 
the  Nationalist  Party.  The  Party  is  at  once  one 
of  the  producers  and  one  of  the  products  of  the 
movement.  The  Nationalist  Government  is  a child 
of  the  Party.  Within  the  Party  and  within  the 
Government  there  are  three  factions,  the  Radicals, 
the  Moderates,  and  the  Conservatives.  The  Nation- 
alist armies  are  still  another  thing.  There  is  the 
Nationalist  Army  of  Chiang  Kai-shek,  an  instru- 
ment of  the  Nationalist  Government  (Hankow), 
and  there  is  the  People’s  National  Army  of  Feng 
Yu-hsiang,  allied  with  but  not  controlled  by  the 
Nationalist  Government.  Each  of  these  is  less  than 
the  Nationalist  Movement. 

There  is  warrant  for  optimism  over  the  Nation- 
alist Movement — which  is  nation-wide  and  which 
extends  beyond  the  field  of  politics, — because  na- 
tional self-consciousness,  expressed  in  a general 
awakening,  is  making  toward  progress,  toward  na- 
tional unity,  toward  independence.  There  is  even 
warrant  for  hopefulness  with  regard  to  the  Nation- 
alist Government.  But  the  oligarchy  which  has 
created  and  which  today  is  that  Government  (Han- 
kow) has  not  yet  made  itself  the  de  facto  ruler  of 
the  major  portion  of  China’s  territory;  nor  has  it 
yet  established  an  effective  civil  administration 
throughout  the  considerable  area  which  its  armies 
have  occupied. 

Events  of  the  past  few  days  (March  20-31),  most 
conspicuously  the  attack  upon  and  killing  of  foreign- 
ers at  Nanking,  suggest  that  there  is  within  the  Na- 
tionalist Army  indiscipline  and  lack  of  authority  and 


22 


indicate  that  the  work  of  the  Propaganda  Bureau  of 
the  Left  Wing  is  creating — or  has  created — an  instru- 
ment of  terror  which,  unless  suppressed,  must  in- 
evitably alienate  the  moderately  and  conservatively 
minded  elements  among  both  Chinese  and  foreign 
sympathizers  with  the  Nationalist  cause. 

What  may  happen  next  within  China,  what  may 
happen  as  between  the  foreign  Powers  and  China, 
how  long  it  may  be  before  a stable  central  govern- 
ment is  evolved  in  China,  what  may  be  the  character 
of  that  government  and  who  its  head,  time  only  will 
reveal.  In  considering  China’s  past,  present  and 
future,  it  is  necessary  at  all  times  to  take  into  con- 
sideration the  size  of  the  country  and  the  enormous 
number  of  the  population.  China  is  changing 
neither  very  rapidly  nor  very  slowly.  Her  mass 
is  such  that  she  can  sustain  no  rapid  acceleration 
and  no  rapid  diminution  of  speed.  The  one  thing 
that  is  certain  is  that  she  is  no  longer  travelling  in 
the  orbit  which  marked  her  course  during  many 
centuries.  She  has  diverged  from  that  line.  She 
is  changing.  She  will  have  to  undergo  much 
change  before  a new  stability  is  reached.  Mere 
impatience  on  the  part  either  of  her  own  people  or 
of  foreigners  will  achieve  nothing.  Patience  on  the 
part  of  both,  constructive  effort  on  the  part  of  the 
Chinese  themselves  and  demonstrated  willingness 
to  assist  on  the  part  of  foreigners  are  the  only 
factors  which  may  serve  to  shorten  the  period  of 
turmoil  and  readjustment  through  which,  like  it 
or  not,  China  must  go  and  the  world  must  watch 
her  go. 


23 


* m w,  m t 


The  China  Society  of  America 
is  an  organization,  incorporated  in 
1913  under  the  laws  of  the  State  of 
New  Y ork,  to  promote  friendly  re- 
lations and  mutual  understanding 
between  the  peoples  of  China  and 
the  United  States. 


